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New Institutional Economics (NIE) and New Institutional Sociology (NIS) provide
complementary paradigms with which to understand the relationship between formal
institutional changes in a reform period and informal institutional structures with which
household economies adapt to reform policies. Survey data gathered from rural Russian
households from 1991 to 2006 provide an empirical test of hypotheses drawn from NIE
and NIS. The most important ﬁnding is that in the absence of secure formal property rights
informal institutional elements played the dominant role in entrepreneurship and
inequality between households in the Russian countryside, but that as formal institutions
became legitimized, and the overall economy stabilized, households that made use of
these new institutional arrangements had signiﬁcant advantages vis-à-vis other house-
holds. At the same time, regions which have provided opportunities for households to
develop a “mixed economy” that combines household enterprise production, which relies
to a signiﬁcant degree on informal institutional elements, and wages and salaries (i.e.,
working for others), which is based on the legitimization of formal institutional arrange-
ments, have produced substantially higher mean household incomes than have other
regions.
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The introduction of market reforms under the rubric of
“shock therapy” in the early nineteen nineties created
a natural experiment with which to view the relative
impact of formal versus informal institutional mechanisms
upon entrepreneurship and economic inequality among
rural households in the emerging rural Russian market
economy. The collapse of the command economy led to
a dramatic rise in inequality and poverty among rural
Russian households, mirroring the situation that occurred
throughout the country. At the same time, however, the
instability of the newly introduced formal institutional
arrangements of market reform stimulated the growth of
rural household entrepreneurship. During the early post-
Soviet years, informal household institutional resources,angUniversity.ProducedanddistributedbyElsevierLimited.All rights reserved.
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the cultural foundation to sustain household labor inputs
and helping networks. This, in turn, supported a survival
strategy that ﬁlled the gap in the agrarian economy that
was left when federal government support for the large
enterprises was substantially reduced.
Over time, however, the gradual legitimization of
formal market reform institutions, including land rental
agreements and loan contracts, along with the stabiliza-
tion of the agrarian economy, has resulted in a reduction in
inequality and poverty and the foundation for a more
sustainable mixed income strategy in which households can
generate income both from their own enterprises as well
as from salary and wages obtained from working for
others.
The same institutional changes that have created the
opportunity for a mixed income strategy have resulted in
the emergence of new entrepreneurial opportunities but
also new sources of inequality between individual house-
holds and between different rural regions. The conceptual
framework for understanding these changes is drawn from
New Institutional Economics (NIE) and New Institutional
Sociology (NIS). These complementary paradigms help us
to understand the process in which informal and formal
institutional elements have relatively greater or lesser
inﬂuences on household business activity and rural strati-
ﬁcation systems at different points in time. Identifying these
time-speciﬁc effects of different institutional elements is
crucial in understanding the changes that are taking place
in post-communist rural economies as well as in emerging
rural economies in general.
The empirical ﬁndings presented in this paper are
drawn from surveys of households in rural Russia. Eleven
surveys have been conducted from 1991 to 2009. The
ﬁndings reported in this paper will focus on two cross-
sectional surveys in two villages in 1991 and 1993
(shortly before and shortly after the collapse of the Soviet
Union), four waves of panel surveys of households in three
villages, conducted in 1995, 1997, 1999 and 2003, and two
cross-sectional surveys, one in ﬁve regions (4 villages in
each region) in 2001 and the other in nine regions (2
villages in each region) in 2006. The proportional stratiﬁed
sampling strategy employed in all of the surveys reﬂects
the relative numbers of different types of households –
single persons, retired couples, working couples without
children, working couples with children, working couples
with children and other adults, single parent households,
and a residual category of “other type” – found in rural
Russian villages. The ﬁeld researchers used face-to-face
interviews to obtain detailed data on different types of
income – salary and wages, household enterprise income
and whether income was monetary (either in rubles or in-
kind payments of grain or services) or non-monetary (i.e.,
what the household produced and consumed itself).
Additional questions were asked of each household
regarding the different ages of household members – to
establish an index of household labor potential, household
helping networks, and land rental. A full description of the
methodology is found in earlier publications (O’Brien &
Patsiorkovsky, 2006: 201–227) and on our Rural Russia
blog/website (O’Brien and Patsiorkovsky, 2011).2. The new institutional paradigms and
understanding household entrepreneurship and
inequality between households
The end of the Cold War and the emergence of rapidly
growing economies in Asia, Eastern Europe and Latin
America have posed a challenge to the simplistic models of
both economists and sociologists. The world is much more
complex than the traditional neo-classical economists or
Durkheimian and neo-Marxian sociologists had suggested.
In the search for a new paradigm, i.e., a new set of
assumptions upon which to build theory and research to
deal with the messy challenges to the traditional para-
digms, a number of economists and sociologists have
created the “new institutionalisms”; New Institutional
Economics (NIE) (North, 1990) and New Institutional Soci-
ology (NIS) (Brinton & Nee, 1998; Granovetter, 1973, 1985).
Both NIE and NIS are connected to the traditions of their
respective disciplines, but each contains some crucial new
elements.
NIE, in contrast to the “Old Institutionalism”, retains the
“rational individual” and the “methodological individu-
alist” assumptions of neo-classical economics, but intro-
duces as subjects for empirical investigation new
institutional elements that affect the efﬁciency and
certainty of contracts in the market place. This is especially
relevant in the case of understanding economies that are
attempting to transition from a pure command institu-
tional structure to one that contains some signiﬁcant
market elements. Issues regarding corruption and the
parties’ faith that contracts will be upheld by “third party
enforcement” as well as the “transaction costs” associated
with different institutional arrangements are an essential
focus of the research agenda of NIE scholars.
NIS scholars retain the traditional sociological core
belief in the importance of social relationships as explan-
atory variables, so that economic actions are assumed to be
embedded in social relationships, but their research agenda
also includes more “individualistic” and “rational choice”
elements. Thus, scholars in this tradition focus on the way
in which rational actors make decisions in signiﬁcant
degree according to the incentive structures provided by
the socio-cultural environments in which they operate, as
well as by creating informal social networks with which to
navigate, and sometimes thwart, the formal institutional
milieu.
Most important, the sociological approach to New
Institutionalism assumes a priori that since informal insti-
tutional elements – culture, normative structures, etc. –
exist side-by-side with formal institutional elements, the
former can become a critical element in the transition from
one formal institutional arrangement to another. Thus, for
example, Szelyeni and Kostello (1998) note that during the
communist era in Eastern Europe, the informal sector of the
economy was a compensatory mechanism that provided as
essential source of adjustment to the limitations of the
formal command institutional arrangements. These same
informal institutional structures play a critical role in the
new market economies.
Taken together, the emphasis on formal institutional
elements in the NIE paradigm and the adaptive features of
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paradigm, can provide us with a more complete under-
standing of the process by which entrepreneurship and
stratiﬁcation systems are altered during a transition from
one type of economy to another. Speciﬁcally, the NIE and
NIS paradigms suggest the following four hypotheses.
H1. In the absence of secure formal property rights informal
institutional elements can be expected to play the dominant
role in household entrepreneurship and inequality between
households. Thismeans that informal household economies,
based on informal institutions including the “moral
economy” and “social helping networks”, will play a greater
role in the early period of reform, when institutions have
not been legitimized in the eyes of citizens. This, in turn, can
be expected to encourage the growth of household entre-
preneurship and differentiation between households.
H2. As the formal institutions of a market economy become
more legitimized, however, we would expect that entrepre-
neurship would become a relatively less important part of the
overall rural household rural economy and thus, in turn,
would become a relatively less important source of differen-
tiation in household income. This would mean that house-
hold economies as-a-whole would become somewhat less
dependent on their own small business income and
somewhat more dependent on salary and wage income
from the formal economy. This does not mean that
household small business income will become trivial, but
merely that in the aggregate its proportional contribution to
total household income will lessen.
Most important, there are elements of the new formal
institutional arrangements that can enhance the potential
for growth of household enterprises, especially the stabi-
lization of land use policies. Although the institutionaliza-
tion of a landmarket for sale and purchase of land has been
extremely difﬁcult to realize, reform policies have
addressed the issue of formalizing land leasing arrange-
ments. Thus, our expectation is that,
H3. Households that participate in land leasing arrange-
ments will be economically better off than their counterparts
that do not employ them.
Finally, as Szelyeni and Kostello (1998) point out, when-
ever there is a substantial shift in the institutional structure
of an economy, such as occurred in post-communist socie-
ties, some of the informal institutional arrangements in the
pre-reform economy, largely centered on the household’s
moral economywill remainbutwill complement rather than
substitute for weaknesses in the formal economic system.
The subsequent emergence of a “mixed rural household
economy,” however, is likely to be dependent to a large
extent on the opportunity structure for households in
different regions. Thus, our expectation is that,
H4. Households in regions that provide opportunities for
households to combine the traditional skills embedded in theinformal institutions of the rural peasant household with
salary and wage income opportunities provided by the
formal institutional changes of the market economy will
generate higher average per capita household incomes than
those regions that do not provide opportunities for a mix of
entrepreneurship and wage and salary income.
3. The institutionalization of market reforms in rural
Russia
There have been many criticisms of the development of
democratic and market institutions in post-Soviet Russia.
The complaints about the slide away from democracy have
included the efforts of Vladimir Putin to gain control of
media outlets, limit the ability of foreign non-
governmental organizations to operate in Russia, silence
powerful oligarch adversaries (e. g., the Khodorkovsky
imprisonment), eliminate virtually all political opposition
and most recently, have himself selected as Prime Minister
by his hand-picked newly elected President Medvedev. The
limitations of Russian reforms of market institutions have
included charges of corruption, crony capitalism, the failure
of the court system to protect property rights, and various
types of intimidation of foreign investors in the energy
sector (Baumol, Litan, & Schramm, 2007: 170; Chazan &
White, 2008).
Despite these obvious ﬂaws in the institutional envi-
ronment in Russia, however, there is evidence that
substantial changes have occurred which have integrated
the country further into the global economy, especially if
they are assessed in relation to the Soviet-era command
economy. Writing in the mid-nineties, during the early
reform period, a scholar who had spent a number of
decades studying the Soviet economy noted that: “Today it
is easy to forget how fundamental the institutional changes
have been in Russia. The transformation has been so far-
reaching that it is hard to remember how absurd the old
communist system actually was, and the current debate
therefore focuses on the shortcomings of the new system”
(Aslund, 1995: 273). A more recent World Bank assessment
of how far Russia has moved toward a market economy
concludes that:
“In the 15 years since the Soviet Union’s collapse and the
start of its economic transition, the institutions and
structure of the Russian economy have greatly changed.
Although much can be said about the inconsistency of
the transformation and the incompleteness of many
structural reforms, there is little doubt that Russia has
moved from a centrally planned economy to a genuine
market economy. All three main goals of economic
reform initiated 15 years ago have been largely ach-
ieved. Prices are liberalized. Privatization is more or less
complete. And the economy is now at least as open to
international competition as many other market econ-
omies” (Desai & Goldberg, 2010: 11).
Nonetheless, for rural households, the primary effect of
the “shock therapy” reforms of the ﬁrst post-Soviet Yeltsin
administration in the early 1990s was the elimination of
government controls onwholesale prices, including inputs,
equipment and products, the liberation of retail prices on
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material and monetary support to the agricultural sector.
Caught in a vicious price scissors, the traditional places of
employment in the Communist system, the collective and
state farms, did not have cash to pay their employees and as
a result households were forced to rely evenmore upon the
production and sales from their personal plots in order to
survive.
By necessity, most households relied almost exclusively
on their own human and social capital (i.e., household
labor and social exchange helping networks) to provide
income from their private plots. This adaptation was built
upon what Szelyeni and Kostello (1998) would term
a compensatory mechanism in the Soviet agricultural
system – i.e., a supplement to an inefﬁcient state
production system and a way of reducing discontent
among workers on the collective farms. While rural resi-
dents reacted very negatively to the sudden loss of the
traditional Soviet-era salary and social service supports,
the institutional changes introduced by the Russian central
government did create a positive incentive for rural
households to become more entrepreneurial. Rural resi-
dents were not opposed to capitalism per se but rather to
the clumsy and insensitive way in which the urban
reformers in Moscow imposed the new institutional
arrangements on them (Wegren, 2005).
Using grain that they received from the large enterprises
as in-kind payment for labor, many households increased
the number of livestock and the size of their vegetable and
fruit gardens and began to produce value-added dairy
products, such as sour cream. These products were then
sold in regional farmers’ markets. The increased output by
households, coupled with the decline in large enterprise
production, due to the severe dislocations caused by the re-
structuring of the agrarian sector, resulted in a substantial
increase in the proportion of Russian agricultural output
accounted for by households. This is shown in Fig. 1.
At the outset of the shock therapy reforms, from 1992 to
1995, the proportion of all agricultural sales in Russia
accounted for by small household enterprises increased
from 31.8 to 47.9 percent, while the proportion of sales
contributed by the large re-organized former collective and
state farms declined from 67.1 percent to 50.2 percent. This
shift in sales was due, in large measure, to the collapse of
the old formal institutional structures in Russian agricul-
ture and the nascent but yet not fully institutionalized0
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Fig. 1. Percent of Russian agricultural sales by type of enterprise and year.
Source: Rossiia v. Tsifrak 2010. (Moscow: FSSS, 2010), p., 245.formal market mechanisms. This in turn, provided power-
ful incentives for households to utilize their informal
institutional mechanisms, largely human and social capital
(household labor and helping networks) to expand their
plot production from a “compensatory mechanism” to
a more important element in Russian agriculture. From
1992 to 1995 the Yeltsin government tried to create a new
class of mid-size private farmers, mirroring the farm sector
in Western Europe, but as shown in Fig. 1 they accounted
for less than two percent of total agricultural scales.
In short, the aforementioned supports the expectation in
the ﬁrst hypothesis that economic differentiation between
households would be largely a function of their relative
abilities to generate income from their household plots. In
the absence of a stable set of market institutions in the early
period of transition from a command to a market economy,
households did in fact rely almost exclusively on informal
institutional arrangements based on the norms and values
of their “moral economy”. This institutional foundation
provided strong social support aswell asmaterial incentives
for household members to cooperate with one another and
to rely upon informal helping networks.
Nevertheless, during the Yeltsin administration several
important formal institutional changes were introduced
that were intended to increase incentives for the develop-
ment of private agriculture. These changes included:
 For the ﬁrst time, in December 1991, the right to leave
a large farm (the re-organized collective and state
farms) and the right to receive land shares upon leaving
 In October of 1993 the legalization of private land
ownership; the right to buy and sell agricultural land
 Presidential Decrees in 1992 and 1993 authorizing legal
agreements to rent land
 In March of 1996, the right to receive a land deed
Thus, in some important ways, the Yeltsin presidency
did lay the groundwork for major institutional changes
which were taken up by his successor, Vladimir Putin.
Putin, who Yeltsin appointed as PrimeMinister in August of
1999 became acting President on January 1, 2000 and was
elected president in March of 2000. The election of Putin in
2000 and his re-election in 2004 marked the beginning of
a period of steady economic growth, averaging more than 7
percent a year from 2000 to late 2008. This growth was
driven to considerable extent by high energy prices, but
also by political stability and citizens’ belief in the legiti-
macy of institutions supporting a market economy.
Putin accelerated the process of institutionalizing the
market economy in the countryside. Whereas the Yeltsin
period was largely characterized by tearing down existing
Soviet era institutions, with the resulting chaos, the Putin
period was characterized by the development of new
market institutional supports and a general goal of social,
political and economic stability. These included:
 In June of 2001, a Land Code that replaced the 1991
Soviet-era code
 In July of 2002, a law regulating the procedure to be
used in rural land transactions
 In 2003, separate laws on private farms and private plots
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Fig. 3. Percent of sample below the poverty level in Russian village surveys
– 1991 to 2006. Source: Russian village surveys.
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tural Development
In addition, starting in 2006 a new program designed to
stimulate agricultural development was introduced as part
of the National Projects (nationaliye proekty). This program,
which had substantial government ﬁnancial support,
brought large capital investments to the agricultural sector
in order to increase agricultural production, in particular
animal husbandry. Along with a goal of “food security,”
substantial amounts of money have been spent on projects
designed to improve the general quality of life in rural
areas, thus encouraging younger, more educated persons
with families to locate in those areas. Included here are
programs to improve housing, water quality and delivery of
natural gas, as well as better access to quality medical care,
education and housing (National Project Priority Website
2010:4). The aforementioned changes, along with other
improvements in the processing of contracts and other
business transfers, as well as the often-cited increase in oil
and gas export prices, further stabilized the Russian
economy and have produced positive growth in the
agrarian sector, even after the national economy began to
contract (The Economist, 2008).
The stabilization of the formal institutions of a market
economy, as well as direct government assistance to agri-
culture through various kinds of assistance programs,
notably the National Project and the Development of the
APK has had a signiﬁcant effect on the proportional
contributions of the different types of enterprises to overall
agricultural sales. This is shown in Fig. 1. The proportion of
sales accounted for by household enterprises increased to
51.6 percent in 2000, but declined to 49.3 percent in 2005
and 43.4 percent in 2008. At the same time, the proportion
of sales by large enterprises increased from 45.2 percent in
2000 to 48.1 percent in 2008. The most striking change is
the increase in the proportion of agricultural output by
Private Farmers, which increased from 1.9 percent in 1995
to 3.2 percent in 2000 and then almost doubled, to 6.1
percent in 2005 and grew to 8.5 percent in 2008.
The world-wide ﬁnancial crisis, which began in the fall
of 2008, led to a decline in the proportion of sales
contributed by large enterprises; from 48.1 percent in 2008
to 45.9 percent in 2009. Consistent with our argument
about the compensatory nature of small household enter-
prises, household enterprises increased their share of
Russian agricultural sales from 43.4 percent in 2008 to 46.4
percent in 2009.
Nonetheless, there is compelling evidence of a long-
term trend of gradual legitimization of the formal0
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Fig. 2. Number of households taking out credit from 1993 to 2005 in a nine
region survey N ¼ 900. (Source: 2006 NCEEER Survey).institutions of market reforms in the eyes of Russian citi-
zens. This is seen in Fig. 2 which shows the years in which
households in our 2006 survey reported that they had
obtained loans for improvement of the infrastructure of
their household enterprises (e.g., money for construction of
equipment for value-added production of dairy products or
barns for shelter of larger numbers of livestock).
There is very little credit activity in the 1990s, when the
newly introduced institutional structures of market reform
were in the process of becoming, but were not as yet,
legitimized in the eyes of ordinary Russian rural house-
holds. There are small upward blips in the trend line in
1996 and 2000, but the most striking change is the steep
increase in the number of households taking out loans after
2001 when the Putin administration’s stabilization of the
economy went into high gear.
Finally, it is critical to note that the legitimization of
formal market reform institutions in rural Russia has had
a positive effect on reducing poverty as well as the
inequality gap between the better and lesser well-off,
which is shown in Figs. 3 and 4. This has had the addi-
tional effect of reducing rural support for anti-reform
parties, in this case the Agrarian Party.
Figs. 3 and 4, which are based on data from eight of our
surveys, from 1991 to 2006, show that the periods in rural
Russia with the highest proportion of households living in
poverty and the greatest inequality were times when
formal institutional elements were especially weak; the
initial period of reform from 1991 to 1995 and in 1999
following the devaluation of the Russian ruble.
Fig. 5 provides us with a summary of how the legitimi-
zation of formal institutions has affected the entrepre-
neurial role of households in the Russian agrarian economy.
There is strong empirical support for our second hypothesis
that as the formal institutions of the agrarian economy
became more legitimized, the relative proportion of the0
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household economy declined. Households continued to
produce and sell commodities from their plots, but theyalso
were able to draw upon salary and wage income from
working for others in a more stable and growing formal
economy. Growth in the proportion of income obtained
from salary and wages is especially strong from 2001 to
2006when the agrarian economy and the Russian economy
as-a whole were growing at a 7 percent annual rate.
The overall improvement in the material condition of
rural households is best illustrated by the line showing the
sharp drop in the proportion of household plot production
income that is non-monetary; i.e., that portion of total
household income that is devoted to consumption. The
curve lowers slightly from 1995 to 1999, consistent with
the position that the Yeltsin regime did have some impact
on stabilizing the formal economy, but the most substantial
decline occurs after the accession of Putin to the Presidency
in 2000. This is shown in the data points from the 2001 and
2006 surveys.
There has been, however, substantial variation in the
extent to which individual households have achieved
economic gains from the legitimization of formal market
institutions and the general stabilization of the Russian
economy. The critical question is: what explains variations
in household success in the reform period? To answer this
question we will turn to our panel surveys.
4. Institutional sources of inequalities between
households
Hypothesis 3 suggests that although rural households
as-a-whole have made signiﬁcant gains from the beginning
to the later stages of the reform period, those householdsTable 1
Impact of initial per capita income and household capital versus increases in h
households from 1995 to 2003. N ¼ 382. Source: Russian village panel survey.
Eq. (1) Eq. (2)
HH Per Capita Income ‘95 .003*** (.000) .003*
HH Labor ‘95 – 243.703*
HH Labor Change ’95-‘03 – 158.5
Number of Helpers ‘95 – –
Change in Number of Helpers ’95-‘03 – –
Rented Land ‘95 – –
Rented Land Change ’95-‘03 – –
Adjusted R2 .085 .127that embraced new formal institutional arrangements
would fare better than their counterparts that did not. One
of the most critical indicators of adoption of new institu-
tional arrangements is the willingness of households to
lease land and thereby increase the production potential of
their plots. The opportunity to rent land during the Soviet
period was very limited but the passage of legislation
(referred to above) that legitimized leasing arrangements
became an important source of economic differentiation.
The data to test this hypothesis was our panel survey in
which the same households were interviewed in 1995,
1997, 1999 and 2003. Per capita household income was
regressed on traditional informal types of household
capital, household labor and household social helping
networks (the informal institutional basis of the moral
economy), which were critical during the initial survival
period, and rental of land. The latter is a form of physical
capital that became more available to households as the
formal institutions of the market economy became stabi-
lized. Land rental, initially was based on informal
arrangements between households, but through federal
government legislation it became institutionalized with
leasing contracts between large enterprises and local
governments, on the one hand, and household renters on
the other.
Table 1 shows the effects of these different types of
household capital on per capita income in 2003.
The initial level of household income in 1995 explains
slightly less than 9 percent of the variance in household per
capita income in 2003 (see Eq. (1)). Household labor is the
traditional source of differentiation between households in
a peasant economy and thus we might expect that as
households gain more labor they would increase their level
of income (Chaianov, 1966; Deere & de Janvry, 1981). This is
the case with total household income (in a regression
equation not shown here), but in the stricter, more
conservative criterion of per capita income the effect of the
traditional source of human capital is modest and mixed.
Eq. (2) in Table 1 shows that the initial level of household
labor in 1995 does have a positive effect on household per
capita income in 2003, but increases in household labor
from 1995 to 2003 actually have a negative effect on per
capita income in 2003. This indicates that although more
labor may increase total household income the addition of
new members, on average, actually lowers per capita
income, which creates disincentives for families to have
more children (O’Brien, Patsiorkovsky, & Wegren, 2004).
The two household labor variables only explain anousehold capital on per capita income in a panel survey of rural Russian
Eq. (3) Eq. (4)
** (.000) .003*** (.000) .002*** (.000)
** (71.576) 197.802** (76.053) n. s.
85*(77.752) 210.697**(81.220) 217.241***(60.251)
n. s. n. s.
108.553* (48.917) 104.541** (36.126)
– n. s.
– 97.095*** (5.437)
.137 .533
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Fig. 7. Mean per capita income, household salary & wages and household
enterprise income in low, medium and high income regions N ¼ 900.
Source: NCEEER 2006 nine region survey. Low Income Regions – Krasnodar
krai, Voronezh oblast; Medium Income Regions – Republic of Tartarstan,
Kurgan oblast, Krasnoyarsk krai, Moscow oblast, Leningrad oblast; High
Income Regions – Altai Krai and Amur oblast. ANOVA of Per Capita Income by
Region: F(2) ¼ 38.673, p < .001. Scheffe: middle income regions > low
income regions; high income regions > middle income regions, p < .001.
ANOVA ofMean Household Salary and Wage Income by Region: F(2) ¼ 23.337,
p < .001. Scheffe: middle and high income regions > low income regions,
p < .001. ANOVA of Mean Household Enterprise Income by Region:
F(2) ¼ 14.249, p < .001. Scheffe: high income regions > low and medium
income regions, p < .001.
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Table1 shows that increasing the size of the helping
network (O’Brien & Patsiorkovsky, 2006: 81–85) does have
a positive but fairly small effect (about 1 percent) on
household income over the long haul. In short, increases in
household labor and social helping networks, based on the
informal institutional foundations of the peasant moral
economy do not explain a great deal of the variance in how
well households are doing in 2003.
Eq. (4) in Table 1 introduces two variables pertaining to
the amount of rented land obtained by a household; the
amount of land rented in 1995, in an early phase of the
reform period, and the total increase in the amount of land
a household rented in the eight years from 1995 to 2008. In
the initial period of reform, when the new formal institu-
tions of the market place were not well established – there
was rancorous conﬂict between the Yeltsin Government
and the Communist dominated Duma (Legislative Branch)
on this issue – and the majority of households were
reluctant to enter into land leasing contracts. Thus, it is not
surprising that the amount of a household’s rented land in
1995 does not have a statistically signiﬁcant effect on
a household‘s per capita income in 2003. As formal insti-
tutions stabilized, however, an increasing number of
households felt more secure about leasing land. Those
households that increased the amount of land they leased
have much higher per capita income levels. The total
amount of variance explained by adding the land rental
variables, in which the only signiﬁcant coefﬁcient is that of
change from 1995 to 2003, is almost 40 percent, increasing
the R2 from .137 to .533 (see Eqs. (3) and (4). Fig. 6 illus-
trates the substantive importance of land leasing as
a source of income differentiation between households.
5. Inequalities between regions
Our fourth hypothesis suggests that those regions in
which households are better able to develop a “mixed
economy”, in which they can combine signiﬁcant skills in
entrepreneurship that were learned in the survival period,
and are based on informal institutional arrangements, with
new wage and salary opportunities will be better off0
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Fig. 6. Amount of variance in 2003 household per capita income explained
by per capita income in 1995, household capital in 1995 and changes in
household capital from 1995 – 2003. Source: Russian village panel survey.
N ¼ 382.materially than their counterparts in regions where there is
not asmuchopportunity to develop amixof the twosources
of income. Fig. 7 provides support for this hypothesis.
Household salary and wage income is strongly posi-
tively correlated with the per capita income levels of
regions. The middle income regions have signiﬁcantly
higher salary and wage income than the low per capita
income regions and the high per capita income regions
have higher salary and wage income than the middle
income regions. These ﬁndings are consistent with the
argument that as formal institutions of market reforms
became more legitimized and enforced in the nation as-a-
whole, those rural regions which were most successful in
developing new sources of salary and wage income also
would be places where average levels of household income
rose.
The relationship between level of household enterprise
income and regional per capita income, however, is more
curvilinear. Low per capita income regions, which are in the
most capital intensive agricultural regions of the country,
offering little in the way of manufacturing and/or metro-
politan commuter income earning possibilities, actually
have higher household enterprise income levels than those
found in the medium per capita income regions. But,
consistent with our argument, the highest per capita
income regions have the most balanced mix of income
sources, deriving from both high salary and wages and
household enterprise sales.
In part, the differences between the ability of regions to
produce a mixed rural economy in which households earn
money fromworking for others as well as working on their
own small business enterprises can be explained by natural
geographic and ecological factors. Yet, it would be
a mistake to assume that these factors explain most, or
even that they are the most critical explanatory variables.
We have noted elsewhere, for example, that regional
governments in Belogorod and Rostov oblasts, two regions
in the “black earth zone” of southern Russia approached the
introduction of formal institutional changes in the early
1990s in very different ways. While the Rostov government
provided support to large enterprises, the Belgorod
government, in addition to supplying support for large
D.J. O’Brien / Journal of Eurasian Studies 3 (2012) 41–4848enterprises, also provided substantial help to households,
especially through credit schemes and other mechanisms
with which to build small- and mid-sized household
enterprises. This early positive embrace of reform, coupled
with support for existing informal institutions, i.e., house-
hold enterprises, resulted in higher levels of material and
psychological well being for those living in Belgorod oblast
(O’Brien, Patsiorkovsky, & Dershem, 1998).6. Conclusion
To properly understand the relative impact of institu-
tional elements on rural household entrepreneurship and
the stratiﬁcation system that results, it is necessary to
understand the relationships between the informal and
formal institutional sectors within a time frame in which
formal institutions are legitimized.
 The ﬁndings of the Russian Village Surveys illustrate
that informal and formal institutional elements are not
necessarily in competition but must be understood as
playing different roles at different time periods in the
process of market reforms.
 Informal institutions that support a peasant household
economy are the best predictors of both entrepreneurial
activity and differentiation between households in the
early phase of reform when formal institutional
elements of a market economy are not fully legitimized.
 But, as formal institutional elements become more
legitimized, especially in the eyes of rural residents, they
will begin to produce a “mixed” rural household
economy, in which informal institutional elements
become relatively less important than they were in the
initial period of reform.
 But, households that utilize new institutional arrange-
ments, especially land rental, will be substantially better
off than their counterparts who rely primarily on the
informal institutional supports of the moral economy.
 However, regional differences in creating institutional
supports for a “mixed economy,” which depends on
both informal and formal institutional foundations will
produce inequalities in household income.
 Finally, the complex relationships between formal and
informal institutional change means that we need to
develop empirical indicators that measure both “bottom
up” informal institutional structures andprocesses aswellas “topdown” formalstructuresandprocesses imposedby
governments over a considerable period of time.References
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